Introduction
In June 1999, a poll taken of London-based economists indicated that 65% believed that the United Kingdom would join the euro area by 2005.
1 A decade later, not only has U.K.
participation in monetary union not taken place, but such a development no longer seems to be the question of "when, not if" that it once appeared. While euro entry has faded as a likely prospect for the United Kingdom, the decade of coexisting European Central
Bank and Bank of England monetary regimes has provided a firmer picture of the differences between the two regimes and of the likely effect that monetary union would have on U.K. economic performance. The analysis that follows uses a structural openeconomy model to evaluate the effect that becoming a euro area member would have on the U.K. economy.
Our discussion in Section 2 provides a background to the debate on European monetary union in the United Kingdom. Section 3 discusses some of the economic arguments that have been raised on both sides of the euro-adoption debate. Section 4 describes the main properties of the model, which is given in detail in an appendix. Section 5 provides simulation results for alternative policies. Section 6 concludes.
The United Kingdom and European economic and monetary union
The issue of economic and monetary union has been a longstanding-though until the late 1980s only a sporadic-part of the debate about the implications of the United Kingdom's integration into the European Union. The successful negotiations for U.K.
entry into the European Economic Community (EEC, now the European Union) during 1970−72 coincided with the EEC's consideration of the Werner Report 2 proposals for economic and monetary union. In fact, the first instance of the term "euro" being used to describe the putative union currency appears to have been in a discussion in the U.K.
press during that period. 3 The United Kingdom seemingly affirmed its commitment to economic and monetary union in joint statements with EEC members in 1972 EEC members in , 1974 EEC members in , 1985 EEC members in , and 1989 . But since 1974, U.K.
policymakers have expressed reservations about -----------------------------------
1 See MacRae (1999) . 2 Commission of the European Communities (1970) . 3 The Oxford English Dictionary online (www.oed.com) gives a 1971 U.K. press discussion as the first use of the term "Euro." But we have been unable to verify this, as the citation details given in the OED appear to be faulty. For the rest of the 1970s, EMU receded as an issue. The EEC's Study Group on the Role of Public Finance (1977, p. 11) noted, "Monetary union, on which much has been written, is... a long way off and will probably have to await major developments in the political, monetary, and fiscal fields." A step in this direction was the European
Monetary System (EMS), in particular its exchange rate mechanism (ERM), 6 which the United Kingdom contemplated joining as a founding member in 1978−79. At the time, however, the exchange rate mechanism was not perceived as part of a formal plan for monetary union. For example, a 1978 U.K. parliamentary committee noted that the EMS proposal was "far from being a major step on the way to European Economic and Monetary Union," and that the Werner proposals for monetary union had been "agreed… but subsequently abandoned." (Expenditure Committee, 1978, p For the 1997 general election, both major political parties were committed to a policy of seeking referendum approval before any final decision to enter monetary union could be formalized. Shortly after its election in 1997, the Blair Government "committed the U.K.
to the principle of joining the single currency" (HM Treasury, 2003a, p. 1), but made any recommendation of actual entry (and hence a referendum) conditional on the five economic tests being passed. The five economic tests (with our numbering in square brackets) are:
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[1] Are business cycles and economic structures compatible so that we and others could live with euro interest rates on a permanent basis? term-structure connection to long rates; and with prices adjusting gradually to aggregate demand, so that a Phillips curve that becomes vertical in the long run describes inflation dynamics). So for the exchange rate to respond to "fundamentals" is not a necessary condition for a floating exchange rate to be desirable. In relation to this point, Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2007) present a model where the exchange rate fails completely to adhere to fundamentals, yet the monetary policy strategy followed by the U.K. authorities in preference to monetary union-i.e., focusing on a CPI inflation target alongside a floating exchange rate-is optimal.
Nevertheless, it is true that one possible benefit of a floating rate is its potential ability to contribute to stabilization. The debate on whether the exchange rate provides this stabilizing role in practice can be represented by reference to a standard uncovered interest parity condition (see e.g., Woodford, 2001, p. 308) :
Debates on the second issue predate the creation of any version of the European Union. Indeed, one of the pioneer Keynesians, Richard Kahn, argued, "If Keynes can be said to have devoted his life to anything, it is to liberating internal policy from the domination of external factors." (Kahn, 1956, p. 113 .) Milton Friedman made a similar assessment of Keynes' contribution (Friedman, 1983) .
where asterisks denote other-economy values, q t is the log real exchange rate, R t is the domestic short-term nominal interest rate in quarterly units, π t is quarterly inflation, and ψ t is an exogenous time-varying risk-premium (i.e., a shock to the UIP condition). There is wide agreement that, in practice, the real exchange rate and the nominal exchange rate move in the same direction in the short run under floating exchange rate regimes.
Therefore, claims about whether the nominal exchange rate performs a stabilizing function can be mapped into similar claims about the short-run behavior of q t .
The view that a floating exchange rate helps macroeconomic stabilization can be broken into two elements: (i) Different shock patterns or different structure in the home economy, relative to the other economy, might lead to the "natural interest rate" differing across economies. To the extent that stabilization of the home economy's output gap and its aggregate inflation rate require adjustment of nominal interest rates to levels different from those prevailing in the other economy, this adjustment can be accomplished because exchange rate flexibility allows interest rates to differ across economies-i.e., q t and E t q t+1 are free to move to satisfy the UIP condition if monetary policy moves domestic real and nominal interest rates away from the corresponding other-economy values.
(ii)
Fluctuations in the risk premium ψ t may occur for reasons of economic fundamentals, and the efficient response might be a nominal exchange rate reaction rather than a reaction of domestic interest rates. With a floating nominal exchange rate, this can occur, and this kind of adjustment has, for example, often been argued to describe the Australian dollar's reaction to the 1990s Asian market crises. Monetary union, however, precludes an adjustment along these lines of the domestic economy and of the nominal exchange rate.
The advocacy of euro membership for the United Kingdom in Buiter (1999) does not use an explicit model, but Buiter's analysis implicitly assumes away the model elements that deliver the scenarios described in (i) and (ii) above. Buiter (1999, p. 30) The record of U.K. monetary policy episodes also suggests that aggregate demand and inflation do respond to monetary policy actions even when the behavior of the exchange rate does not appear to be in keeping with the direction expected from a monetary policy change: for example, tightenings in 1976 and 1989 were followed by contractions in aggregate demand, even though the sterling exchange rate depreciated for protracted
periods. The predominant conclusion from theory and evidence is that domestic channels of monetary policy are present and substantial, so, as suggested above, floating exchange rates confer on the central bank the ability to determine nominal aggregate demand and the inflation rate, even if the exchange rate channel cannot be relied upon.
In opposition to position (ii), the euro entry advocates have argue that the UIP shock ψ t is not a fundamental shock; rather, it reflects an inefficiency or "noise" created by the foreign exchange market, and so any movement it tends to induce in q t is undesirable. By analogy with the cost-push shock in large DSGE models (see especially Smets and Wouters, 2005, p. 163) , the UIP shock is, according to this argument, a friction that distorts prices and moves the economy further away from its efficient allocation, and is not a shock to which real variables would respond in an efficient flexible-price equilibrium. This argument leads to Buiter's (1999) position that it is desirable to abolish the sterling/euro foreign exchange market by imposing monetary union. Then the condition R t = R t * is an identifying feature of a monetary union. The nominal exchange rate is removed from the system as a variable. To the extent that UIP shocks owe their existence to the market for nominal foreign exchange, the elimination of that market removes UIP shocks from the model. Monetary union is, in that case, materially different from both floating-exchange-rate and fixed-exchange-rate environments.
The view of critics of monetary union is that union does not remove UIP shocks; instead, it changes the way that they create pressures. Blanchard (1997, p. 288) , for example, argues that "while a common currency will indeed eliminate exchange rate crises, it will not eliminate the underlying reason for such crises-namely, the fact that different interest rates, as well as adjustments in exchange rates, are needed…" Elimination of a floating nominal exchange rate, according to this view, removes a convenient means with which to adapt to the pressure of UIP shocks. Absent floating exchange rates, the pressure of such shocks might be felt in other economic relationships. For example, the pressure formerly felt as UIP shocks might now manifest itself as an increase in the variance of shocks to the IS equation.
All in all, the a priori arguments that led to Buiter's (1999) conclusion that the case for euro adoption by the United Kingdom was "overwhelming" do not seem compelling, as modern open-economy models produce many counterexamples. It is desirable instead to consider an explicit structural model that embeds and quantifies many of the model elements underlying the debate on monetary union. We do this in Section 4.
The sterling appreciation
The United Kingdom experienced a "strong pound" period starting in 1996 and continuing during nearly a decade of the euro's existence (see Figure 1 ). This period has been said to demonstrate the defects of floating exchange rates as an arrangement for the United Kingdom. It has been emphasized by critics of floating that the sterling appreciation is difficult to trace to economic fundamentals (see e.g., Cobham, 2006) . The recent sudden reversal of the pound appreciation, at a time of worldwide contraction in the financial services business, is said by euro-membership advocates to demonstrate further the disadvantage of the United Kingdom's exercise of its opt-out from euro participation. Proponents of U.K. participation contend that the strong pound shifted U.K. employment from the exchange-rate-sensitive manufacturing sector to the financial services sector, and that the latter increase in employment has proved to be ephemeral.
In our view, however, this episode does not provide unambiguous evidence against the advantages claimed for floating exchange rates. In particular, the case made by membership proponents neglects the major contribution to macroeconomic stabilization We would argue that, by concentrating on the stabilization of macroeconomic aggregates, the Monetary Policy Committee over this period managed to stop the manufacturing contraction from being associated with aggregate economic contraction. The reason it was able to do this was the United Kingdom's monetary policy autonomy, which neither a monetary union nor fixed exchange rate would have permitted.
As for the rapid end of the strong-pound era in 2008, this can be seen as a stabilizing development. By stimulating net exports, the turnabout in sterling behavior lessened the implications for U.K. aggregate output and employment of the downturn in the U.K. 
A structural model for considering monetary union questions
The model we use is the two-country open-economy system of Erceg, Gust, and López- As the model has been laid out in detail in Erceg, Gust, and López-Salido (2007), we simply summarize its main elements here, presenting the basic equations in an appendix.
Households' consumption choice is represented by a standard Euler equation.
Government spending in each country is exogenous and is the source of an "IS" shock.
The production function features labor input, an exogenous technology shock specific to each economy, and a fixed capital stock. Labor is immobile across countries. Firms and workers enter the goods and labor markets respectively with a degree of monopoly power and with Calvo-style obstacles to adjustment of the offered prices for their goods and labor services. These contracts are augmented by dynamic indexation: all wage contracts are scaled up by the prior period's wage inflation rate; all price contracts, by prior price inflation. In our estimated version of the model, imports are final consumer goods. The prices of imports are flexible.
Specification and estimation
We assume that the home economy's size is 20% that of the other economy, in order to
give the model a "United Kingdom = home economy; euro area = other economy" interpretation. We set the steady-state share of government spending in GDP to 0.33 in the United Kingdom, 0.338 in the euro area. The import share of GDP for each economy is intended to capture the degree of each economy's trade with one another. We make the share 13.5% for the United Kingdom; together with the relative sizes of the economy, this implies a 2.7% import share for the euro area. The latter takes such a low value because we are neglecting non-U.K. imports into the euro area, given the model's twoeconomy structure. We fix the exchange rate elasticity of traded goods at EGL's baseline value of 1.5 and the steady-state wage markup in both economies at 50%. The discount rate (β) is set at 0.9925, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set at 1/σ = 1/2, and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply assumed to be χ = 5.
While we estimate the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption and the labor supply elasticity of households using U.K. and euro area data, we constrain the estimate of each parameter to be the same across the two economies.
The monetary policy rule specification is similar but not identical across economies. For the United Kingdom, the monetary policy rule has the short-term nominal interest rate respond in a smoothed manner to the lagged four-quarter retail price inflation rate (which we use as the empirical measure for the United Kingdom of consumer price inflation, π C ) and to lagged detrended log output y:
Here constants are suppressed, and the monetary policy shock e Rt is assumed to be an AR(1) process. Other than lagging the variables one more period, this specification is a restricted version of the policy rule estimated for the United States by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , and also follows their use of loglinearly detrended real GDP as the variable to which the authorities respond. Again paralleling Rotemberg and Woodford's specification, the above reaction function above delivers a "long-run" rule of the Taylor form. Our modeling of policymaker behavior using this simple three-parameter rule requires justification in light of Favero's (2000, p. 237) position that "a strategy closer to the spirit of intertemporal optimization seems more appropriate" in the estimation of policy rules. The use of a simple rule can be defended both on practical grounds-the EGL model is too large for the implied optimal-policy conditions to deliver rules tractable enough for econometric estimation-and for reasons of realism-the inflation variable that U.K. policymakers over our sample concerned themselves with was a CPIlike concept, not the combination of wage inflation and domestic-goods price inflation that the EGL model would tend to suggest should be targeted.
For the euro area, a similar policy rule specification is estimated, though with no constraint that the estimated responses, or the AR(1) parameter and innovation variance for the shock, be the same as in the United Kingdom. An important qualification is that for the euro area we assume that the inflation variable that enters the rule is the (annualized) one-period lagged quarterly GDP deflator inflation rate (as opposed to the lagged four-quarter CPI-type rate in the U.K. case). The deflator inflation rate is assumed to enter the rule even though it is the HICP aggregate that we use as an observable in obtaining our estimates below (where it is used to correspond, for the euro area, to the model's consumer price index). The assumption that euro area policy responds to deflator inflation follows Smets and Wouters (2005) .
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Each economy has Phillips curves for wage and for price adjustment. Each Phillips curve has its own univariate AR(1) shock term. The remaining shocks in the model are two real shocks for each economy-government spending and technology-and a shock that we add to the EGL model, namely a shock to the UIP condition, so that the UIP condition in our model resembles equation (1). The two real shocks for each economy (four in total) and the UIP shock are assumed to be AR(1) processes. Because asymmetry of shocks is a central issue for the debate on monetary union, the stand we take on correlations of shocks is important. We allow the government spending shock to be
The United Kingdom is the "rest of world" for the euro area in the two-economy model we are using. Assuming a euro-area monetary policy response to deflator inflation captures, more than would an assumption of a policy response to consumer prices, the notion that euro area policy does not respond to U.K. inflation when the United Kingdom is outside the monetary union.
correlated across economies, and so too the technology shock to be correlated across economies. This cross-correlation is allowed for by empirical estimation of crosscorrelations of the shock innovations. We constrain the monetary policy and Phillips curve shocks to be uncorrelated across economies.
The data used in model estimation are, for each economy, detrended logs of per capita consumption, output, and the quarterly real wage (with consumer prices used to deflate nominal wages); (consumer/retail) price inflation for each economy; the nominal U.K. Smets and Wouters (2003) . One of the simulation experiments that we undertake below allows for more wage rigidity in the euro area. For both economies, the rule estimates indicate substantial interest-rate smoothing, a long-run response to inflation close to 1.5, and an output response somewhat below the value (0.5/4 = 0.125) associated with the Taylor rule.
-----------------------------------
17 In addition to the U.K. variables described there, we have nominal wages for the United Kingdom among our observables. Nominal wages for the United Kingdom consist of total compensation (Office of National Statistics series dtwm.q), divided by aggregate employment (series bcaj.q). 18 Starting estimation in 1981 allows the overhaul of doctrine that took place in U.K. economic policymaking in the late 1970s, documented in Nelson (2008) , to make itself felt in changed monetary policy responses to the state of the economy. As a related matter, omitting pre-1980 observations from the sample helps avoid inclusion in estimation many of the substantial breaks in means, trends, and variances from the 1970s to the 1980s in the U.K. data, documented for example by Stock and Watson (2002) , Benati (2008) , Boero, Smith, and Wallis (2008), and Surico (2008) . Note: The estimated probabilities of wage and price adjustment are the probability that no discretionary adjustment is allowed this period (in which case a default adjustment takes place of indexation to the previous period's inflation rate of the index in question). Beta distribution prior used for these probabilities; normal distribution prior used for the other parameters. With the partial exception of the monetary policy shocks, which have only moderate autocorrelation, all the estimated shocks in the model are strongly persistent. In particular, the UIP shock is highly serially correlated. This autocorrelation combines with the estimated innovation variance to give an unconditional standard deviation for the UIP shock of about 0.5%, a surprisingly modest value.
There is considerable asymmetry in the real shocks facing each economy, with the correlation between innovations to technology being below 0.2 and that between government spending innovations being below 0.3. This is consistent with previous evidence for European economies. For example, Söderström (2008, p. 10) argues that "asymmetric shocks seem to be important for the Swedish economy," while Artis and First, for the identified VAR, the estimated foreign contribution to domestic economic variability is more modest in our example-and this is despite the fact that we do, and
Justiniano and Preston do not, include the exchange rate shock among the foreign shocks.
Second, in moving to the structural model, we do not find a dramatically smaller contribution of foreign shocks' contribution to domestic economic fluctuations. In that sense, the understatement problem for our euro area/U.K. structural model is less serious than that found by Justiano and Preston (2006) for their open-economy model of the United States and Canada. But this finding is subject to the proviso that, as noted above,
we categorize exchange-rate shocks in both the VAR and structural models as foreign shocks. It is true that most of the foreign contribution to U.K. output variation in our structural model comes from this source, whereas in the VAR, the shocks to the euro-area variables form the bulk of the foreign influence on U.K. output growth.
Simulation experiments
In this section we present illustrative results from simulations of the model. We consider three assumptions about model structure, starting with the estimated model as the baseline.
A. Baseline case
In the baseline case in Table 2 , we assess U.K. economic performance using the estimated model under different monetary policy rules: historical policy and monetary union. We focus on variability of output, CPI inflation, and the short-term nominal interest rate. We acknowledge that open-economy models like those used in this paper frequently do not justify a monetary policy focus on aggregate CPI inflation, and direct attention instead to domestic-goods inflation or to a combination of domestic-goods and wage inflation. But CPI inflation is bound to be a key variable in a study of U.K. policy options. That is the inflation rate focused upon in the U.K. current policy framework, and so is a key variable to consider in judging the merits of U.K. entry into monetary union.
Historical policy uses the U.K. and euro area interest-rate rules set out in the estimated model. The mode values in Tables 1A to 1C are taken to be the model estimates. When we consider monetary union, the historical U.K. policy rule is dropped in favor of R t U.K. = R EA t (where "EA" denotes euro area), and since the United Kingdom is then a euro area member, the euro area output and price aggregates that enter the euro area policy rule include the corresponding U.K. series. The price aggregate is assumed to be a loglinear combination of the non-U.K. and U.K. economies' output deflators. Subject to these augmented definitions of the aggregates, the interest-rate policy rule assumed for the monetary union is the same as that estimated empirically for the euro area: smoothing of 0.79, a response to lagged quarterly inflation that implies a 1.27 "long-run" response, and a response to lagged detrended output that implies a 0.085 "long-run" reaction.
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Historical policy in our parameterized model gives, as reported in Table 2 Nevertheless, even when UIP shocks are present, their effect on the results is not dramatic, apparently because our estimates imply a fairly modest variance for this class of shock.
B. Wages relatively more flexible in the United Kingdom
Estimates of a dynamic general equilibrium model for the United Kingdom in DiCecio and Nelson (2007) suggested that U.K. nominal rigidity was concentrated in prices, rather than spread across wages and prices equally. This finding is roughly reflected in our estimates here too. But it is puzzling that we also find that the probability of wage adjustment is also quite rapid in the euro area, which contrasts with estimates such as those of Smets and Wouters (2003) . In light of this, we now consider an alternative parameterization of the EGL model in which wages are more flexible in the United Kingdom than in the euro area. Specifically, we raise the degree of nominal rigidity in the euro area above its estimated value. It is now assumed that the probability that wages are not reoptimized is 0.60 in the euro area.
We report the simulation outcomes in the middle set of results (Case B) in Table 2 .
When there is no monetary union, the standard deviations of U.K. series are virtually unchanged from those under the baseline parameterization. Since the only change in parameterization is to the degree of euro area wage rigidity, the results make economic sense; they reflect the notion that floating exchange rates can insulate the domestic economy from divergences across economies in the degree of nominal rigidity. The loss of the exchange rate mechanism and of an own-economy interest-rate rule now seem to have visible costs; U.K. inflation stabilization worsens drastically under monetary union, when compared to that under the historical U.K. monetary policy rule, regardless of whether UIP shocks are present. The magnitude of the difference in inflation variability implied by historical rules and that implied by monetary union is very large in Table 2, and may be questioned. The difference would likely be more modest if, for example, we had assumed a more modest divergence between U.K. and euro area nominal rigidity.
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We would not give credence to the quantitative magnitude of the results from this model setting. But, qualitatively, the results illustrate the possibility that nominal exchange rate movements help compensate for differences in nominal rigidities across countries.
As in the previous set of results, U.K. interest-rate variability does decline when there is monetary union. Thus embrace of monetary union appears to confer on the United Kingdom more stable interest rates, but these are accompanied by a rule that is directed at aggregates of which U.K. variables make up only a modest portion. Furthermore, the mismatch of contract durations across economies means that rules that are successful at stabilizing euro area inflation are less effective at stabilizing U.K. fluctuations. The net outcome is greater U.K. macroeconomic instability.
Monetary policy is less volatile in the sense that interest rate volatility declines when the United Kingdom joins the union; it gives up a domestic policy rule that was associated with less smooth interest rate behavior. But inflation outcomes become more volatile for the U.K. economy. What appears to be happening is that the less volatile rate behavior is destabilizing for U.K. inflation because of the major mismatch in nominal rigidity; i.e., the interest rate should be more volatile, or should be responding in a different way to shocks than what is implied by the euro rule, if the objective is to insulate the U.K.
economy from the effects of nominal rigidity. 21 The damage done by the imposition of the euro area rule overwhelms one beneficial effect on inflation variability arising from euro area wage patterns. This beneficial effect is that the relatively greater euro area wage stickiness by itself should be helpful for U.K. inflation stabilization by stabilizing U.K. import price inflation. This partial effect seems to dominate when the difference in wage stickiness across economies is a little less than what we are using in the table.
C. Intermediate goods predominant
We revert our settings of wage rigidity to the estimates in Table 1 in order to consider a third model variant. Wilson (1976) and Allsopp, Kara, and Nelson (2006) argue that, for U.K. inflation analysis, it is appropriate to model all imports as intermediate goods. With this formulation, imports enter the model alongside labor in the production process to yield final consumption goods. We consider a parameterization of the EGL model that allows for this view of imports' role to predominate. In the baseline parameterization, 100% of imports were final consumer goods; now, by contrast, 90% of imports are assumed to be intermediate goods and only 10% to be final goods. 22 We repeat the policy experiments with this alternative setting of the model in the final segment of Table 2 .
Monetary union appears to worsen inflation performance somewhat-even when UIP shocks are absent-and to reduce the variability of the output gap and the interest rate.
When imports are primarily intermediates, exchange rate variations have a less automatic connection to CPI variations; the fraction of the CPI that is flexible and linked tightly to the exchange rate is small. Under these conditions, extinguishing exchange rate variations is less likely to deliver improved inflation performance, if this also entails giving up the ability to manipulate domestic interest rates.
-----------------------------------
Conclusions
We have considered euro area membership as a U.K. monetary policy option by studying the effect of monetary union under various parameterizations of the Erceg, Gust, and López-Salido (2007) model. One issue in determining whether monetary union contributes to an improvement in U.K. macroeconomic stabilization is the status of the "UIP," or foreign exchange risk-premium, shock. Much hangs on whether the elimination of the sterling/euro exchange market will be associated with the suppression of UIP shocks, which have been thought to be a major source of exchange rate variation.
Suppose these shocks stand in for pressures that the economy needs to adjust to whether it is part of a monetary union or not. Then if the United Kingdom joined the euro area, UIP shocks, instead of vanishing, would continue to make themselves felt via different channels. Our results suggest that monetary union may increase inflation variability if UIP shocks do not disappear at the inception of monetary union. This effect is detectable even though, according to our estimates, UIP shocks are actually only a modest inherent source of exchange rate variation.
We also affirmed that if the differences in the degree of nominal wage rigidity across the United Kingdom and the euro area are sufficiently large, U.K. inflation variability under monetary union is higher than that achievable under monetary policy autonomy. Finally, we found that the improvement in U.K. economic stability under monetary union also diminishes if imports from the euro area are modeled as primarily intermediates instead of finished goods.
There is a risk-sharing condition: The preceding outline features imports only as final consumer goods. EGL (2007) also present a version of their model with some imports being intermediates. We use a version of this model, making the assumption that some imports into the U.K. economy are used for production, in our Case 3 experiments in Table 2 .
